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Abstract
Responding to a major pandemic and planning for allocation of scarce resources 
(ASR) under crisis standards of care requires coordination and cooperation across 
federal, state and local governments in tandem with the larger societal infrastructure. 
Maryland remains one of the few states with no state-endorsed ASR plan, despite 
having a plan published in 2017 that was informed by public forums across the 
state. In this article, we review strengths and weaknesses of Maryland’s response 
to COVID-19 and the role of the Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network 
(MHECN) in bridging gaps in the state’s response to prepare health care facilities 
for potential implementation of ASR plans. Identified “lessons learned” include: 
Deliberative Democracy Provided a Strong Foundation for Maryland’s ASR Frame-
work; Community Consensus is Informative, Not Normative; Hearing Community 
Voices Has Inherent Value; Lack of Transparency & Political Leadership Gaps 
Generate a Fragmented Response; Pandemic Politics Requires Diplomacy & Per-
sistence; Strong Leadership is Needed to Avoid Implementing ASR … And to Plan 
for ASR; An Effective Pandemic Response Requires Coordination and Information-
Sharing Beyond the Acute Care Hospital; and The Ability to Correct Course is Cru-
cial: Reconsidering No-visitor Policies.
Keywords COVID-19 · Pandemic · Triage · Resource allocation · Ethics 
committee · Community
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Until 2020, the United States had avoided widespread ravages of a modern-day pan-
demic. While the Federal and State governments had done some planning, includ-
ing tabletop exercises, testing the assumptions embedded in the hypothetical sce-
narios has been a real-life challenge. As COVID-19 case numbers began to rise, 
healthcare providers across Maryland wondered how a hypothetically derived and 
theoretically supported allocation of scarce resources (ASR) plan would hold up in 
practice. Responding to a major pandemic requires coordination and cooperation 
across sectors: federal, state and local governments in tandem with larger societal 
infrastructure. State governments are tasked with playing a major role in pandemic 
response—redundancy, inefficiency, and inequity may result without centralized 
state oversight and broad transparency. Here, we review strengths and weaknesses of 
Maryland’s response to COVID-19 and the role of the Maryland Healthcare Ethics 
Committee Network (MHECN) in bridging gaps in the state’s response to prepare 
health care facilities for potential implementation of ASR plans.
Lesson #1: Deliberative Democracy Provided a Strong Foundation 
for Maryland’s ASR Framework
A Johns Hopkins -led project team comprising Johns Hopkins Medicine, the Ber-
man Institute for Bioethics, and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center held 
Deliberative Democracy forums across Maryland between 2012 and 2014 to con-
sider the role of the community in determining which ethical principles should guide 
decision-making about scarce life-saving resource allocation in a catastrophic health 
emergency (Biddison-Daugherty et al. 2017). This work was funded by a grant from 
the federal Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. The 
project team held eight forums with lay people and seven forums with disaster and 
healthcare workers. Primary data sources were pre- and post-surveys, notes from 
group deliberations, and exit interviews with selected participants. A total of 324 
individuals participated, representing a diverse selection by race, education level, 
socioeconomic status, and religious affiliation. Forum participants were given mate-
rials to review in advance that discussed hypothetical emergency pandemic sce-
narios with insufficient ventilators across Maryland hospitals. In the half-day mod-
erated forums, participants weighed which ethical principle(s) out of six should 
determine the patients that receive priority ventilator access: (1) those most likely to 
survive the current illness; (2) those who could go on to live the most life years; (3) 
those who could go on to live through more life stages; (4) those who would be of 
most value to others (e.g., first responders, parents/caregivers, essential workers); (5) 
those who arrived earliest to the facility (i.e., first-come, first-served), or (6) equal 
priority for all patients (e.g., lottery).
Anticipatory public discussion about ASR in a crisis is critical because: (1) the 
public will bear the consequences of these decisions; (2) the public’s values are 
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central to choosing among multiple ethically permissible ASR approaches; (3) a 
successful allocation process requires public trust and cooperation, both of which 
are more likely if the process has been transparent, inclusive, and impartial; (4) 
knowledge of public perspectives and morality better prepares health authori-
ties to develop preparedness plans, allocation guidance and risk communication 
for contentious issues; and (5) advanced discussion and planning are essential 
because there is little time for in-depth deliberations with the public, government, 
legal community and hospitals in the midst of a pandemic (Daugherty Biddison 
et al. 2014, p. 778).
The Deliberative Democracy approach (as opposed to polling or inviting the pub-
lic to comment on drafted policy) provides materials for participants to review, time 
for deliberation, a structure to moderate discussion, and multi-disciplinary experts 
to present scenarios and basic medical facts. This format ensures participants reach 
the same starting point, fostering open and informed conversations from multiple 
perspectives based on the best information available. The forum approach allows 
participants to express their values and reasoning behind principle selection, while 
also providing opportunities for participants to change their views after listening 
to other members of the community. For example, many participants were initially 
concerned about or opposed to removing a ventilator from one patient in favor of 
another in the context of pandemic triage, considering this morally unacceptable. 
However, about half of the respondents changed their mind on this issue by the end 
of the half-day forum discussion, recognizing that such an approach would likely 
save more lives (although many remained concerned about bias influencing these 
decisions) (Daugherty Biddison et al. 2014). While the labor-intensive nature of this 
approach precluded representing every sector of the community, it has been recog-
nized as an exemplar of community engagement surrounding ASR in crisis stand-
ards of care (CSC).
Lesson #2: Community Consensus is Informative, Not Normative
While the goal of the Deliberative Democracy project was to inform the ethical 
principles supporting Maryland’s ASR framework used during CSC, incorporating 
descriptive data into normative guidelines proved challenging. For example, based 
on participants’ appraisals of the ethical principle to use first when allocating ven-
tilators during periods of scarcity in a pandemic, the three ethical principles most 
commonly ranked first were: saving the most life-years (37.6%), surviving the cur-
rent illness (31.2%), and value to others (17.2%). The same three principles, ranked 
slightly differently, bested the others (proportion of respondents who selected 
“often” or “always”) when participants were asked how often each of the six princi-
ples should be used (surviving the current illness: 71.1%; live longer: 56.3%; value 
to others: 48.1%) (Daugherty Biddison et al. 2014, 2018). Reconciling these results 
with other ethical analyses involving ASR processes proved difficult. For example, 
the bioethics literature in general advocates that while frontline workers should be 
protected, it should not be in the form of an ASR triage score that gives them pri-
ority access to scarce resources (Sveen and Antommaria 2020). Maryland’s ASR 
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framework ultimately excluded the principle of value to others, despite forum results 
placing this principle among the top three principles selected. However, the result-
ing ASR framework did preserve a point credit for women gestating a fetus with a 
detectable heartbeat as recognition that a mother is of instrumental value to her new-
born (Biddison-Daugherty 2017).
Similar to other ASR frameworks (Antommaria et al. 2020), Maryland’s frame-
work adopted Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA), a scoring system 
developed to predict mortality over the short-term for ICU patients. SOFA can help 
assess organ dysfunction or failure, with a higher score indicating poor physiologic 
function in multiple organs, which is associated with a higher predicted mortality. 
Worries remain over whether SOFA is the best predictor of benefit from a ventilator 
as well as over the lack of data for short-term survival from COVID-19. Further-
more, there are concerns about computation errors that may disadvantage persons 
with certain chronic conditions. For example, persons with asymptomatic chroni-
cally elevated bilirubin (Gilbert’s syndrome) may receive a poorer liver component 
score than their actual liver function warrants; those with disrupted renal dialy-
sis access may have higher creatinine levels that could yield poorer overall SOFA 
scores, and those with a history of a chronic neurologic condition such as Cerebral 
Palsy or paralysis may receive a poorer score for central nervous system function 
without accommodating for their stable baseline condition. However, no other sci-
entifically rigorous scoring system has been developed that is feasible to implement 
in the context of pandemic triage that would correct for certain prior health care 
inequities.
Maryland’s ASR framework accounted for community members’ concerns about 
disadvantaging those who, as a result of systemic racism and inequities in receipt 
of health care, showed shorter life expectancy and would thus be de-prioritized if 
subjected to a scoring method that quantified comorbidities. This was accomplished 
by assigning a lower-priority score only to individuals with less than a one-year life 
expectancy due to certain underlying conditions, and no triage score adjustment 
based on quantifying comorbidities. Thus, the community value of “surviving the 
current illness” (expanded to a one-year interval) was prioritized over the commu-
nity value of “life years saved.” Three other ethical principles were incorporated into 
Maryland’s 2017 ASR framework as tie-breakers: life stages (allocating points by 
age, including prioritizing individuals 0–49  years of age and deprioritizing those 
85 years and older); and fair chance via lottery or first-come, first-served methods.
Lesson #3: Hearing Community Voices Has Inherent Value
The perception of transparency, inclusivity, and representativeness are arguably the 
greatest benefits from the public engagement that informed Maryland’s 2017 ASR 
framework (the “2017 Plan”). The ethical principle deemed most important by mem-
bers of the community—saving the most lives—is prioritized in the 2017 Plan’s triage 
scoring. However, not all community values were retained, and some that were retained 
have since been criticized (e.g., civil rights advocates challenged the inclusion of age as 
a tie-breaker and other aspects of the triage score calculation as vulnerable to implicit 
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biases that may disadvantage individuals with disabilities). These objections highlight 
the challenge of using public engagement to inform policy. Not all stakeholders will be 
represented. Furthermore, stakeholder groups represented by organizations advocating 
on their behalf may not all share the same position. Consensus arising from discussions 
among individual citizens may look very different from recommendations arising in 
response to legal and political advocacy. Broader consensus from triage experts and the 
bioethics literature must also be considered.
Oberlander and colleagues (2001) described similar challenges related to Oregon’s 
experience using public engagement to guide Medicaid services rationing. While some 
might view this as a reason why community engagement is not worth the effort, we dis-
agree. Cultivating community voices builds public trust and support, which are essen-
tial in pandemic planning and ASR implementation. As Oberlander and colleagues 
summarized (2001, p. 1586): “The real innovation in Oregon has been drawing on pub-
lic participation to build public support ….” It was hoped that the same would be said 
for Maryland’s 2017 Plan.
Lesson #4: Lack of Transparency and Political Leadership Gaps 
Generate a Fragmented Response
Unfortunately, there were delays in funding the final phases of the Hopkins ASR pro-
ject and the ASR framework was not completed until August, 2017. For reasons we are 
not privy to, no state action was taken to implement the framework’s recommendations. 
Lack of political will foreshadowed problems that thwarted a streamlined state response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Most notable among the problems was the absence of a 
coherent, consistent and accessible state ASR plan (or more broadly, a CSC plan). This 
deficiency is apparent in Manchanda et al. (2020) review of state CSC plans in which 
Maryland is noted as having “none identified.”
In a pandemic, difficult decisions are made by clinicians and emergency response 
workers in real time. Ideally, the state government provides the structure and the assur-
ances necessary for public discussions about these difficult choices. Without statewide 
dissemination and discussion of an ASR plan, various stakeholder groups (e.g., the dis-
ability community, racial/ethnic minorities, the elderly), and health care institutions had 
inconsistent access to a potential state plan drafted by a group of hospitals in the state 
(see below). Although public–private partnerships emerged to fill some gaps (e.g., The 
Baltimore Convention Center Field Hospital operated jointly by the University of Mar-
yland Medical System and Johns Hopkins Hospital, and arrangements with local hotels 
to provide lodging for individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2), a lack of action at 
the state level created inefficiencies and patchwork policies.
Five Hospital Systems Respond
In the absence of a state-endorsed ASR plan, shortly before the anticipated April 
2020 COVID-19 case surge in Maryland, a group composed of representatives 
of four major health systems (Johns Hopkins, Lifebridge, MedStar, and the 
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University of Maryland) formed in March 2020 to develop an operational ASR 
plan from Hopkins’ 2017 Plan. A fifth hospital system, Luminis, was later added. 
The “5H” group initially focused on allocation strategies for ventilators. A focus 
on ventilators came in response to data from Italy and elsewhere pointing to esti-
mates that the demand for ventilators would be much higher than their supply 
across the state (Broadwater 2020; Broadwater and Wood 2020). Consistent with 
the 2017 Plan, the ethical framework that guided the 5H Plan included the duty to 
provide care and to steward resources. The 5H group built on the ethical justifica-
tions underlying the 2017 Plan: maximizing benefit by saving as many lives as 
possible, grounded in substantive and procedural justice.
The 5H group (encompassing about half of the state’s hospitals) shared vari-
ous drafts of their plan with the Governor’s office. Their primary goal was to 
provide an ASR plan for their five hospital systems. A secondary goal was to 
have their plan adopted by all Maryland hospitals to create consistency across 
the state in how hospitals addressed ASR during the pandemic. State-wide con-
sistency in ASR implementation could have been accomplished by gubernatorial 
action via an executive order under Maryland’s Catastrophic Health Emergencies 
Act requiring all hospitals to implement the 5H’s ASR Plan, if the need arose to 
ration critical care resources. The Governor’s executive order would have also 
triggered immunity from civil or criminal liability for any physician who com-
plied with the state-authorized plan. This would include removing a patient with 
a poor chance of recovery from a ventilator after a specified trial period, with-
out consent, in order to provide it to another patient with a greater likelihood of 
survival. However, the Governor did not endorse any version of the 5H Plan or 
make it available for hospitals to review and plan accordingly. Instead, the Gov-
ernor decided to put the plan on hold until the situation called for its activation. 
Unfortunately, this wait-and-see strategy stymied an opportunity to address oper-
ational and administrative challenges within and across hospitals and health sec-
tor coordination.
Maryland Hospital Association Responds
The Maryland Hospital Association (MHA), serving its members, distributed a 
draft of the 5H Plan in May to hospital CEOs after receiving a presentation from 
members of the 5H group. While MHA’s dissemination of an earlier draft of the 
5H Plan allowed some hospitals to plan internally for its execution, coordination 
both locally and regionally to achieve a standard implementation process was 
thwarted by lack of central organization at the state level. Unfortunately, several 
hospitals did not attend the MHA presentation or receive the 5H Plan. One exam-
ple is a small hospital on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. The director of chaplaincy 
there undertook extensive efforts to locate information about how her hospital 
should respond if it depleted its available resources to treat patients with COVID-
19. She was grateful to discover an invitation to join the statewide COVID-19 
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working group sponsored by the Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network 
(MHECN).
State Ethics Network Responds
MHECN is a membership-supported organization affiliated with the University of 
Maryland Carey School of Law that has served members of healthcare ethics com-
mittees in the state since 1993. It sponsors ethics education programs, distributes a 
newsletter, promotes networking in healthcare ethics, weighs in on ethical questions 
and concerns raised by its members, and engages in research and policy initiatives 
relevant to local clinical practice and healthcare ethics (Tarzian et al. 2006).
About the time that the 5H group was assembling to enact its plan, MHECN 
invited interested members to join a COVID-19 working group (WG) to address 
members’ questions about the anticipated COVID-19 case surge. With representa-
tives from both large hospital systems and smaller institutions, as well as outpa-
tient physicians, bioethicists, lawyers, and nursing home and hospice leadership, 
MHECN provided a forum to raise concerns and problem solve as the challenges 
of the pandemic became apparent and evolved over time. MHECN’s forum proved 
especially important given government silence in response to the potential need for 
ASR.
The WG began meeting by ZOOM twice weekly in March, with initial discus-
sions devoted to operationalizing the 2017 Plan with its focus on allocating ventila-
tors if rationing became necessary. The WG learned of the 5H group’s work and 
was ultimately provided a draft of the 5H plan with a request by the 5H group not to 
share it to avoid different versions of the plan “floating around” the state, potentially 
leading to hospitals applying different criteria. The goal of both the WG and the 5H 
group was to have consistent ASR standards and procedures across all hospitals in 
the state. However, as a group representing five private hospital systems, the 5H 
group had no responsibility to share its work with others – again pointing out the 
challenges of working on a plan divorced from state oversight.
The WG also served as a kind of “safety valve” for staff to share concerns out-
side of their home institution, whose policies were sometimes opaque to them. For 
instance, how PPE was allocated at members’ home institutions, and on what basis, 
was unclear to some. WG members also expressed discomfort about teams of medi-
cal students and residents who were patently unable to manage safe distancing and 
consistent masking, clustered as they are in the “hard geography” of the hospital 
team rooms, where charting, eating, and learning all take place at once. The WG 
offered its perspective on ways such practices might be modified. A conversation 
up and down the levels of responsibility is necessary for even something as “sim-
ple” as infection control to be implemented meaningfully. Neglecting this is a rec-
ipe for deteriorating staff morale, and is disrespectful to staff who deserve the full 
measure of harm reduction approaches to safeguard their well-being. In  situations 
of stress, asking staff to “just trust us” may only add to their sense of uncertainty, 
which greatly amplifies anxiety and stress and reduces efficiency that is central to an 
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effective pandemic response. WG members reminded those sharing these concerns 
of best practices for protecting their well-being.
Another example of how the WG was able to fill in informational gaps was lack 
of awareness of the Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems’ 
(MIEMSS) newly-developed online capture of available ICU beds, ventilators, and 
dialysis units available at hospitals across the state. This database was to be updated 
several times a day during the COVID surge. Access to this information was central 
to the question of when a hospital would switch from contingency standards of care 
to CSC (thus invoking ASR). While individual hospitals’ incident command center 
staff were aware of its existence and how to access it (only particular individuals 
in the hospital have requisite permissions), this information was not always shared 
with other frontline staff. Sharing this critical information assuaged concerns among 
hospital-based WG members that there would be a clear signal when their facility 
would transition to CSC.
Civil Rights Advocacy Groups Respond
Leading up to and during the COVID case surge in early 2020, many states reviewed 
previous ASR plans as a basis to address any possible shortages resulting from the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Likewise, disability rights advocates reviewed the plans’ lan-
guage to forgo discrimination. Alabama’s 2010 “Crisis Standards of Care” plan, for 
example, specifically precluded access to mechanical ventilators for patients with 
“profound mental retardation,” “moderate to severe dementia,” and “severe trau-
matic brain injury” (Mello et  al. 2020, p. e26(2)). In April 2020, the Department 
of Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights (OCR) announced an early 
resolution of its complaint against Alabama after the state removed rationing guide-
lines “that allegedly discriminated on the basis of disability and age” (DHHS, April 
8, 2020). Further, OCR voiced concerns that the 2010 Criteria, if used to guide ASR 
for patients with COVID-19 should that need arise, could “impose blunt age catego-
rizations, such that older persons might automatically be deemed ineligible for life-
saving care without any individualized assessment or examination and based solely 
on missing a strict age cutoff” (DHHS, April 8, 2020).
To avoid this type of discrimination, the WG requested a meeting with disability 
rights advocates, who gave feedback on Maryland’s 2017 Plan. However, because 
the 5H ASR plan was not disseminated by the state and lacked an authoritative 
“home,” no identified entity could centrally receive comments/suggestions. Instead, 
the WG initiated a meeting at which 5H representatives heard directly from disa-
bility and aging advocates. This meeting fostered interaction with stakeholders and 
further refinement of the proposed ASR plan that would ordinarily be the province 
of the state policy process. Embargos on sharing earlier drafts of the 5H Plan (see 
Ehmann et al., in press, for a recently published version) and lack of procedures for 
receiving public feedback revealed the shortcomings of this ad hoc approach.
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Lesson #5: Pandemic Politics Requires Diplomacy and Persistence
The MHECN WG realized it would be advantageous if the state took a more active 
role in making the 5H Plan available to the hospitals and to the public. As a result, 
the WG leadership met (virtually) with the authors of the 5H Plan and suggested 
that both groups collaborate. Members of the 5H Plan were in agreement with the 
need to make the plan publicly available, but worried about their ability, moving 
forward, to revise the plan in response to changing data and new information about 
the virus and its treatment. They considered the plan a living document needing to 
change as the circumstances warranted.
Both groups (5H and the WG) acknowledged the need to balance “nimbleness 
and transparency” and thus proposed a path forward that would not require that the 
Governor, at least initially, adopt the plan. It would simply require that the 5H Plan 
be posted on the state department of health’s website. Comments by interested per-
sons or organizations could then be forwarded to the 5H group for their consider-
ation. However, the WG also recommended that if the Governor adopted the 5H 
Plan as a state document, the state use the Governor’s website and social media to 
announce the request and provide the details of the specific triage plan in question 
(e.g., ventilator, dialysis, etc.), and invite comments to the Governor’s office. The 
comment period would be whatever was feasible under the circumstances.
The Governor would also be asked to appoint a statewide “Central Triage Com-
mittee” as recommended in the 2017 Plan. In the event of the need to triage, this 
Committee would “review triage decision-making on a state-wide level,” conduct 
research based on state-wide data collection, and, if necessary, modify allocation 
algorithms (Daugherty-Biddison et al. 2017, p. 19). Subsequently, the WG drafted a 
letter to the Governor consistent with this agreement and had it approved by the 5H 
group. On August 19, 2020, the letter was delivered to the Governor’s office, but as 
of the writing of this article, no response has been received.
Lesson #6: Strong Leadership is Needed to Avoid Implementing ASR 
… And to Plan for ASR
The first wave of critically ill COVID-19 patients created an “all hands-on deck” 
demand for staffed ICU beds to meet the need for “space, staff, and stuff” (Daugh-
erty-Biddison 2017, p. 27). Maryland’s Governor managed the pandemic through 
the expansion of medical capacity and associated supplies and staff in order to avoid 
having to implement an ASR plan unless absolutely necessary. The action plan was 
to flatten and lower the transmission curve by containing the spread of the virus 
through widespread testing, contact tracing, and quarantine procedures to reduce 
hospitalizations, alongside messaging to encourage the public to don masks and rou-
tinely use protective measures (i.e., frequent hand washing, physical distancing, and 
avoiding crowds) to limit their exposure to the virus.
The plan was to add 6700 beds in 40 days throughout the state. With the help of 
FEMA funds and reallocation of state monies, additional in-hospital units as well 
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as field hospitals, such as the one at the Baltimore Convention center, were created. 
Additional ventilators from the Federal Government and medical and operational 
staff from the Army Corps of Engineers augmented the state’s resources. More 
importantly, these efforts allowed the responder community to avoid implementing 
a rationing plan. Maryland’s Governor also purchased test kits from South Korea 
to boost testing capacity (despite a setback of flawed kits requiring replacement), 
along with what tests were available in the U.S. This increased testing plan and pub-
lic compliance helped decrease the state’s peak positivity rate from 26.9% to 3.39% 
over 18 weeks (May 1 – September 1). June 17 marked the first time the positivity 
rate dropped below the 10% target in every jurisdiction.
Based on the media reports of the state’s strategy, the Governor enacted 38 
executive orders to reduce the transmission of the virus and to facilitate more effi-
cient treatment of infected individuals (e.g., by allowing health care providers not 
licensed in Maryland to work in the state and allowing retired health care providers 
to provide services without reinstating their inactive license). These actions mirror 
what occurred in New York, New Jersey, and other states in the northeast and upper 
mid-Atlantic to contain the spread of the virus. However, concerns remained about 
limited testing capacity and long turnaround periods for results as fall and winter 
approached, especially absent a coordinated federal response. Furthermore, prepar-
ing for the worst (i.e., planning for ASR implementation) was not considered a pri-
ority (Sisak 2020).
We believe that in the face of a pandemic of unknown severity, planning for the 
worst is essential. Keeping the ASR framework out of public view was perhaps 
intended to minimize panic and unnecessary worry. This approach, however, cre-
ated other problems. Not having these processes in place before Maryland’s April 
2020 COVID-19 spikes caused confusion and stymied the coordinated and effi-
cient response that typifies effective disaster planning. This is not a guarantee going 
forward. Even if viral contagion remains in check, there is value in planning for a 
“worst case” scenario. “Piloting" ASR practices across facilities and implementing 
a statewide ASR oversight mechanism could prove useful for future health emer-
gencies in the state. Moreover, although ASR for the Spring 2020 COVID-19 case 
surge was avoided, the anticipation that it might have been necessary created anxi-
ety among frontline workers who were uncertain how their facility would respond. 
The ability to reduce uncertainty by “planning for the worst” and thus relieve anxi-
ety among responders during the high-stress milieu of a pandemic is inherently 
worthwhile.
Lesson #7: An Effective Pandemic Response Requires Coordination 
and Information‑Sharing Beyond the Acute Care Hospital
ASR plans have been, and largely remain, hospital centric. It is understandable 
that hospital systems are initially at the forefront when facing acute shortages of 
resources to treat critically ill patients. However, it soon became evident to the 
MHECN WG that other resource shortages affected the COVID-19 pandemic 
response. The need to expand beyond the focus on ventilator shortages further up 
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the chain to directly reduce the need for ventilator allocation quickly became appar-
ent. WG meetings focused on strategies to disseminate information about the state’s 
COVID-19 response in three general areas: (1) minimizing hospital admissions 
through community initiatives and coordination between acute care facilities (e.g., 
hospitals) and chronic care facilities (e.g., nursing homes and hospices), (2) clarify-
ing processes for standard, contingency, and crisis standards of care for hospitalized 
patients, and (3) preventing hospital discharge delays by streamlining processes for 
post-hospital care (e.g., caring for patients with COVID-19 post-discharge at home, 
rehabilitation facilities, hospice, and long-term care (LTC) settings) (see Table 1). 
The diverse representation among WG members meant there was valuable pooled 
expertise and frontline experience. WG members shared resources not known to all, 
and MHECN was able to disseminate this information to its members.
Responding to Needs Outside Acute Care Hospital Settings
Healthcare systems scrambled to offer telehealth, home care, and hospice services, 
which were critically important in meeting the needs of the community. The state 
government allied with the private sector to provide housing for homeless individu-
als. A state 2–1-1 number was advertised to identify individuals at risk and match 
needs with available resources. The state medical reserve corps and other volun-
teer services were mobilized (although onboarding/training and matching needs and 
services could be improved). One success story that spread nationally centered on 
the Maryland Baptist Aged Home in Baltimore, where no cases of COVID-19 were 
detected after its director took early precautions to prevent the spread of the virus 
among its predominantly African American residents (Rodericks June 18, 2020). 
This provides “proof of concept” that education and early response precludes rely-
ing on hospitals and ASR to save lives.
Attention to state-of-the-art advanced care planning and documentation of pref-
erences [via advance directives and accurate Maryland Orders for Life Sustaining 
Treatment (MOLST) orders] may have reduced the frequency of “standard of care” 
defaults to aggressive ICU-level care at the end of life when it was inconsistent with 
an individual’s goals of care. In the context of COVID-19, individuals who prefer to 
remain in the community and in their residential facilities should have that option. 
Failure to provide this simple matching of needs and resources should be one les-
son we carry with us post-pandemic. It will require attention to the conversations 
patients have with their health care agents regarding goals of care and end-of-life 
preferences.
The LTC setting is one sector that deserves special consideration. Attention on 
nursing homes during the COVID-19 pandemic has frequently focused on unaccept-
ably high death rates. This could reflect substandard care or the reality that elderly 
persons are simply more likely to die from COVID-19, despite the level of medi-
cal attention they receive. The death rate for LTC residents who tested positive for 
SARS-CoV-2 in the U.S. is 25.2% (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services); 
the LTC death rate in Maryland is 14.2% (Maryland Department of Health, a). 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































formidable. For example, Maryland’s Office of Health Care Quality fined 24 nursing 
homes for failing to submit daily COVID-19 reporting information required by the 
Governor’s executive order (Tan and Chason, 2020). While improving compliance 
can be beneficial, there can be unintended consequences. A culture of rigid com-
pliance without exceptions puts additional stress on LTC staff, and this heightened 
pressure at a time when staff were already over-burdened due to no visitor policies 
and related COVID-19 infectious control processes may have presented excessive 
demands. Thus, ASR plans that focus on hospitals—while important—should not 
detract from how the LTC community can best be supported.
Another example of hospital-centric thinking is that supplies of remdesivir were 
allocated to hospitals. As a result, individuals with COVID-19 who met remdesi-
vir eligibility criteria and resided in non-hospital settings capable of administer-
ing intravenous medication were only able to access the drug to treat COVID-19 if 
they were transferred to a hospital—indeed, the emergency use authorization from 
the Food and Drug Administration only allocated it to hospitals [despite research 
showing it to benefit patients not on mechanical ventilation, earlier in the disease 
trajectory (Beigel, et al. 2020)]. Allocation strategies that do not take into account 
the intersection of different types of institutions will prove inadequate at best, and 
potentially wasteful at worst. This again points to the importance of transparent 
information sharing and communication so that the different sectors of health care 
delivery can work together to most appropriately and efficiently distribute valuable 
resources.
Lesson #8: The Ability to Correct Course is Crucial: Reconsidering 
No‑visitor Policies
Evaluating the effectiveness of pandemic responses and their effects on the com-
munity is critical. The evolution of no-visitor policies adopted almost universally by 
health care institutions provides a useful example. The impact of no-visitor policies 
implemented in hospitals and LTC facilities by the end of March, 2020 amplified the 
negative effects of social distancing and deeply affected the social well-being of all 
(Smith et al. 2020). Although important to limiting the spread of COVID-19, these 
policies also placed a significant burden on patients and their families. The vari-
ous strategies implemented to keep patients connected to their loved ones, such as 
telephonic check-ins and/or virtual visits on electronic devices, required enormous 
amounts of time and effort by the staff to facilitate. WG members shared stories of 
LTC residents who, in the absence of face-to-face visits, suffered from social isola-
tion, depression, decreased appetite and loneliness. The impact of the no-visitor pol-
icies was clearly underestimated and an unintended consequence of good intentions.
Visitors provide support not only to their loved ones but also to the staff. WG 
members shared how staff at various facilities (both acute and chronic care settings) 
experienced moral distress, moral injury and burnout due to witnessing the effects 
of no-visitor policies, despite the time staff spent coordinating patient-family tele-
visits. Stressed staff are more prone to make errors, which can harm patients. Fur-
thermore, stress-associated absenteeism increased the workload for other staff and 
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arguably cost facilities extra dollars in contract labor. However, more flexible insti-
tutional visitation policies would require adequate personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and testing and regulations to support this flexibility.
Allowing limited family and others to visit in special situations, for example, at 
the end of life and during childbirth, was allowed at most institutions. This came 
with its own challenges. For one, loved ones may have felt pressured to accept that 
the patient was dying in exchange for the opportunity to visit in person. Many facili-
ties limited the number of visitors who could visit a dying patient, which presented 
a dilemma for some patients. For example, the presence of a religious practitioner is 
very important to many, particularly at the end of life (Roman 2020). One WG mem-
ber reported that his institution designated a faith practitioner as one of the three 
persons allowed in a dying patient’s room at any given time. As Karlawish and col-
leagues (2020) concluded: “… good policy demands more nuanced thinking about 
how some visitors contribute” not only to the patient’s safety, but also to the holistic 
care of the individual. Allowing this humane accommodation admittedly requires 
implementing clear policies and procedures and ensuring access to properly donned 
PPE. On June 19, 2020, the Maryland Department of Health granted LTC facili-
ties permission to allow LTC residents to visit with loved ones outside of the facil-
ity if certain prerequisites were met, including absence of COVID-19 cases among 
staff and residents, adequate staffing, and adequate availability and use of PPE and 
SARS-CoV-2 testing capabilities (Maryland Department of Health, b). One can 
appreciate the burden placed on such facilities to meet these demands.
Conclusion
The Maryland ASR framework that was published in 2017 recommended that a cen-
tral state-wide committee be formed to oversee the ASR process in the event of a 
catastrophic health emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic. Had such a committee 
been developed, it could have facilitated agreement and coordination across the state 
to disseminate, modify, and prepare to operationalize the 2017 Plan for use across 
hospitals. Not only is an ASR plan essential for each hospital, so is a state plan 
essential to unify and bring order in managing a crisis. This foresight pays multiple 
dividends. Instead of mounting anxiety and confusion, the public sees public and 
private sector leaders following predetermined procedures to yield the most favora-
ble outcomes. A state-endorsed ASR plan also minimizes the criticism and opposi-
tion hospital executives, department leaders, and incident commanders may face in 
response to their ASR plan which, in itself, can thwart smooth implementation of 
the plan. Being prepared allows frontline staff to focus on response and therefore 
save the most lives.
Even with the Governor’s leadership and the results produced by public health 
and private sector partnerships’ universal mitigation and response plans, Maryland 
has not suppressed the pandemic yet. Over the summer months, public complacency 
and reduced vigilance allowed the virus to resurge and increased the state’s positiv-
ity rate over the 5% rate set by the World Health organization. Fortunately, hospitali-
zations and the need for ICU services have decreased, but deaths continue to rise. 
1 3
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With the hospitalizations and ICU admissions of patients with COVID-19 relatively 
under control (despite recent case increases after the Thanksgiving and Christmas 
holidays), it is an ideal time to work through the oversight responsibilities, proce-
dural challenges, public messaging, and interdependency needs of a state-endorsed 
ASR framework. Perhaps this “reality check” could help underscore the importance 
of infection control and social distancing measures to halt the virus’s spread. And 
even if Marylanders do not perceive immediate benefit to such planning, it is likely 
that coordinating a central response for pandemic planning that includes a statewide 
ASR process will help streamline the response to future catastrophic health emer-
gencies in the state.
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